Short Analysis · International Security · Federalism

Open, but unregulated: what 180 funding programmes reveal about the treatment of the defence industry

Melih Can Erdönmez7 min read
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Translated from the German original on 19 November 2026.

Symbolic image: production hall of an industrial company.
Symbolic image: production hall of an industrial company.Photo: NomadSoul1

Key points

  1. Since 2025, the EU, the federal government and several promotional banks have explicitly opened up to the security and defence industry: KfW makes all its domestic funding programmes available to it, and since June 2026 the European Innovation Council has also funded dual-use technologies.
  2. The picture in the federal states is different: of 146 current state programmes recorded in the edznotes Förderkompass, 107 say nothing about whether defence projects are eligible. Only 17 programmes from four states explicitly allow them.
  3. Where states draw limits, they do so in very different ways: Bremen explicitly excludes military-technology projects, Thuringia links the exclusion in the GRW to collective bargaining coverage, and Brandenburg removed it in 2026.
  4. Where a guideline is silent, the funding body decides case by case. This mainly affects smaller firms and start-ups that depend on state programmes and their house bank.
  5. Often, one clear sentence in the guideline would be enough. On 30 June 2027 alone, 20 state programmes expire or must be extended – a good opportunity.

Anyone applying for funding from Hamburg’s investment and promotional bank IFB will come across a remarkable sentence in its exclusion list. Controversial weapons such as cluster munitions or anti-personnel mines are excluded; for projects “for the defence of state sovereignty & security”, there will be “where applicable, an extended assessment of eligibility” (IFB Hamburg, 2023 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). That is neither a yes nor a no. At European and federal level, by contrast, the question has been answered: KfW has opened all its domestic funding programmes to the security and defence industry (KfW, 2025 (öffnet in neuem Tab)), and since June 2026 the European Innovation Council has also funded defence and dual-use technologies (EIC, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). For the edznotes Förderkompass (funding compass, in German), 180 current funding programmes of the EU, the federal government and all 16 states were examined, as of 1 November 2026, to see whether they allow defence. This means projects and companies of the security and defence industry, from weapons and ammunition to military equipment and defence technology. Defence counts as permitted only if the guideline or promotional bank explicitly mentions defence or armaments; a programme that only funds dual-use, i.e. technology with both civilian and military uses, permits it to a limited extent. At the EU, at federal level and at some promotional banks, the opening has been explicitly set down. The funding guidelines of the states mostly say nothing about it. This analysis shows what this means for companies and how the states could change it with little effort: with one clear sentence in their funding guidelines.

A former taboo becomes funding policy

For public promotional banks, financing defence was long a sensitive issue. With the Russian attack on Ukraine and the aim of rapidly expanding the European defence industry, this has shifted. The European Investment Bank still excludes weapons and ammunition, but now finances military equipment, infrastructure and technologies through a dedicated office for security and defence (EIB, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). With the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), the EU has created a dedicated instrument for expanding production capacity (European Union, 2025a (öffnet in neuem Tab)). And since 2025, the mid-term review of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) has explicitly allowed the states to use funding to expand industrial defence capabilities, with priority for dual-use (European Union, 2025b (öffnet in neuem Tab)).

The federal government follows this line. In addition to KfW, it supports defence exports with export credit guarantees, depending on the goods and the recipient country (Federal Export Credit Guarantees, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). Two large promotional banks of the states have also taken a clear position: since the beginning of 2026, NRW.BANK has described companies in the defence industry as “eligible in principle” in its funding requirements (NRW.BANK, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)), and the Bavarian LfA makes all its programmes “explicitly” available to the sector, since May 2026 also by law (LfA, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab); Bavarian Law and Ordinance Gazette, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). In both cases, controversial weapons such as cluster munitions or anti-personnel mines remain excluded.

The guidelines are silent

A different picture emerges once you read the states’ funding guidelines themselves. Of the 146 current state programmes in the Förderkompass, 107 say nothing about whether defence projects are eligible. They are explicitly permitted in 17 programmes, and these come from only four states: Bavaria, North Rhine-Westphalia, Hesse and Lower Saxony. In Lower Saxony, it is a single programme, the innovation funding for eleven districts of the transition region between the Weser and the Elbe, whose guideline mentions “defence technologies” verbatim (NBank, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). In the six eastern German states, none of the 46 programmes recorded explicitly mentions defence. And the more directly the money flows, the rarer a clear statement becomes: of 51 state programmes offering grants, 4 explicitly permit defence; of 55 offering loans, 11.

Silence does not mean prohibition. The Joint Task for the Improvement of the Regional Economic Structure (GRW), through which the federal government and the states fund investment in new plants, explicitly does not exclude the defence industry: the federal coordination framework clarifies in a footnote that the excluded area of “defence” does not include the defence industry (GRW Coordination Framework, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). And Baden-Württemberg states that all of the state’s financial instruments are also open to the security and defence industry (Landtag of Baden-Württemberg, 2025 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). In the documents of the programmes themselves, for example at L-Bank, there is no mention of this, however. Anyone submitting an application reads the guideline and the information sheet, not a ministry’s statement to the state parliament.

Where states draw limits, they draw them differently

Bremen excludes state funding for “explicitly military-technology projects”, but permits dual-use (Senate of the Free Hanseatic City of Bremen, 2025 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). In its GRW guideline, Thuringia excludes the manufacture of weapons, ammunition and combat vehicles, but only if the company is not covered by a collective agreement or does not increase its wage bill by at least 3.5 per cent a year (Thüringer Aufbaubank, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). There, the exclusion therefore serves more as a lever for working conditions than as a decision of principle.

Brandenburg has gone the opposite way. The GRW guidelines of December 2025 still excluded the “manufacture of weapons, ammunition and military combat vehicles”. In the guideline of August 2026, which replaces both, this point is missing (State of Brandenburg, 2025 (öffnet in neuem Tab); State of Brandenburg, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). Berlin, for its part, decided in December 2025 to build an ecosystem for defence technology (Berlin Senate Chancellery, 2025 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). At the same time, the Berlin loan programme “Berlin Innovativ PLUS” excludes companies whose focus is weapons and ammunition, including research and development for them (IBB, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)).

There are also limits at federal and EU level. INVEST, the investment grant for business angels, excludes manufacturers of weapons, ammunition and combat vehicles (BAFA, 2024 (öffnet in neuem Tab)), and the EU research programme Horizon Europe is limited to civilian applications (European Union, 2021 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). But these limits are explicitly set out. Anyone who reads them knows where they stand.

What silence means for companies

The silence of the state guidelines can be seen as an advantage. It leaves the funding bodies room for manoeuvre, and it spares state governments a political debate that would be controversial in some states. For companies, however, it comes at a price. Whether a defence project is funded is then decided case by case, possibly only late in the process. With promotional loans applied for through the house bank, there is the added factor that the bank may have its own rules on financing defence. A guideline that says nothing gives the bank no certainty either.

Smaller companies and start-ups are particularly affected. Large corporations are more likely to reach the European programmes and the federal financing instruments that have explicitly opened up. For smaller suppliers and young technology companies, by contrast, state programmes are particularly important: innovation grants, start-up funding, guarantees. This is precisely where the situation is least clear: none of the guarantee banks of the 16 states, which step in when young firms lack collateral, says anything about defence. There are also differences in cooperation with universities. Bavaria declares civil clauses – commitments by universities to conduct research only for civilian purposes – inadmissible (Free State of Bavaria, 2024 (öffnet in neuem Tab)), while Bremen’s Higher Education Act excludes research and teaching with an “exclusively and from the outset military objective” (Senate of the Free Hanseatic City of Bremen, 2025 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). For joint projects across state borders, this does not make planning any easier.

Instead of clarifying their funding rules, several states rely on other instruments: networks for the security and defence industry, for example in Schleswig-Holstein with a focus on maritime defence, or in Rhineland-Palatinate (WTSH, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab); SVI-HUB Rhineland-Palatinate, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). North Rhine-Westphalia is also planning its own technology and development centre intended to bring new defence technology into series production more quickly (State Government of North Rhine-Westphalia, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). Such offers can help companies, but they are no substitute for a clear answer to the question of whether their project may be funded.

That the need is recognised is shown by a statement for the record in the Bundesrat: in January 2026, Berlin, Brandenburg, Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt called for “targeted funding programmes” for small and medium-sized enterprises, suppliers and start-ups in defence supply chains (Bundesrat, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). New programmes are one possible route. It would be quicker and cheaper to make the existing ones unambiguous, especially in these states, whose own programmes have so far said nothing on the matter.

What the states could do

First, the states should set out explicitly in their funding guidelines and in the principles of their promotional banks whether defence projects are eligible and, if so, under what conditions. NRW.BANK and LfA show that no new programme is needed for this; one paragraph in the funding requirements is enough. Even a reasoned exclusion, such as the one Bremen has chosen for explicitly military-technology projects, gives companies more clarity than silence. The opportunity will arise in any case: on 30 June 2027 alone, 20 state programmes expire or must be extended, because the transition period of the most important EU state aid rules ends then.

Second, the states should decide openly whether to use the new scope of EU regional funding. Since the mid-term review of the ERDF, they may use funds for defence capabilities. Of the 24 state programmes in the Förderkompass that are recognisably financed from the ERDF, none has so far explicitly permitted defence. A short, public decision by each state would show which path it wants to take.

Third, the federal government and the states could agree on a common wording, for example in the Conference of Economics Ministers. The states would not have to fund the same things. It would be enough if every guideline answered the same question. That would make the work of companies active in several states considerably easier.

Conclusion

Funding policy for the defence industry has shifted within a short time. The EU, the federal government and some promotional banks have explicitly changed their stance. The funding guidelines of most states have not followed this development; they are silent. This keeps room for manoeuvre open, but shifts the decision to the individual case and thus to the companies with the least capacity to clarify it. This requires neither new money nor new programmes. Often, one clear sentence in the guideline would be enough for companies to know where they stand.


Further reading: All programmes with their classification, evidence and a link to the application office can be found in the Förderkompass (in German).

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