Cold War II: regional power centres in the Middle East and their strategic autonomy
Translated from the German original on 19 November 2026.
Cold War II in seven steps
Keep scrolling – the map follows the text.
One region, many power centres
In the Middle East, global power competition and autonomous regional conflicts overlap. States pursue their own interests and combine military, economic and diplomatic relations with different partners.
Partners of several power centres
Turkey has been a NATO member since 1952 and at the same time maintains a close but conflict-ridden relationship with Russia. Saudi Arabia remains closely tied to the USA on security and is expanding its relations with China. Egypt is a long-standing military partner of the USA, a strategic partner of China and a member of BRICS.
Syria: a proxy order collapses
With the fall of Bashar al-Assad on 8 December 2024, Iran and Russia lost an ally they had supported for years. For Moscow, the bases at Tartus and Hmeimim offered opportunities for military power projection in the eastern Mediterranean.
Iran's network loses its link
Iran maintains relations with Hezbollah, Iran-aligned Iraqi militias and the Houthis. Under Assad, Syria was an important logistical link to Lebanon. The line schematically shows former land connections, not current territorial control. Assad's fall makes these connections more difficult.
From indirect to direct confrontation
Israel and Iran attacked each other directly as early as 2024. On 22 June 2025, US forces bombed Iranian nuclear facilities; on 28 February 2026, a new American-Israeli air campaign began. Direct attacks and conflicts fought through armed partners exist side by side.
Hormuz: where military power and geoeconomics meet
According to the IEA's Oil Market Report of 12 August 2026, the Strait of Hormuz has again been effectively closed since early July. Regional war is putting pressure on international oil supplies and prices – military escalation and economic dependencies are intertwined.
Overlapping networks, own interests
Global competition meets autonomous regional interests. States and armed groups depend on their partners to different degrees. Their room for manoeuvre can grow through new relationships, but can also shrink through wars and political upheaval.
Own chart, edznotes · Base map: Natural Earth (public domain) · Borders simplified; Golan Heights assigned to Syria under international law
Key points
- In the Middle East, global power competition and autonomous regional conflicts overlap. Military partnerships, economic relations and diplomatic cooperation do not always lead to the same alignments.
- Regional states and armed groups pursue their own interests. Their room for manoeuvre varies; great powers can influence their partners, but cannot fully control their decisions.
- Assad's fall weakened a Russian-Iranian order of influence. At the same time, the confrontation between Israel and Iran has involved direct attacks since 2024; in 2025 and 2026, US forces also took part directly in attacks on Iran.
- Trade, energy, raw materials, technology, capital, infrastructure and supply chains link economic interests with security issues. Interdependence and geopolitical competition exist at the same time.
- “Cold War II” is an analytical label for long-term power competition under changed conditions. Historical breaks within blocs and regional autonomy are as much part of the comparison as today's overlapping networks.
“Nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war.”
— John F. Kennedy, address at American University, 10 June 1963 (öffnet in neuem Tab)
Analysis as of 15 August 2026. Facts, sources and assessment revised on 9 October 2026.
When I first looked into the question in 2024 of whether a new form of Cold War was emerging in the Middle East, the comparison seemed obvious at first glance. Iran exercised a large part of its regional influence through Hezbollah and allied militias. Russia, together with Tehran, kept the Assad regime in power. The United States supported Israel and provided military backing for its partners in the Gulf. The powers behind them were visible – but a considerable part of their competition was not fought out directly between them.
Today I see it rather differently.
Since then, several preconditions have shifted. Direct attacks and conflicts fought through armed partners exist side by side. At the same time, security relationships, economic partnerships and diplomatic cooperation often run in different directions. Regional actors pursue their own interests. Their room for manoeuvre, however, differs depending on military capabilities, economic dependencies and the political situation.
Assad’s order collapsed on 8 December 2024. Israel and Iran attacked each other directly as early as 2024 (House of Commons Library, 2024 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). US forces bombed Iranian nuclear facilities on 22 June 2025; on 28 February 2026, a new American-Israeli air campaign began (U.S. Department of Defense, 2025 (öffnet in neuem Tab); U.S. Department of War, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). The subsequent course included attempts at ceasefires and renewed escalation (IEA, August 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). These changes affect regional actors differently: with Assad, Iran lost an important partner, while other states are building new relationships and reweighting their security interests.
Great powers can influence their regional partners, but cannot fully control their interests and decisions. This applies to sovereign states as well as to armed groups, albeit to different degrees. A military partnership alone does not make a state a proxy. Alliances can create mutual dependencies in which both sides try to use the other’s room for manoeuvre for their own ends.
The security architecture of the Middle East is also changing as a result:
Israel is a particularly close military partner of the USA and an autonomous regional power centre. SIPRI counts it among the nine nuclear-armed states and describes indications of the further modernisation of its nuclear programme. Israel does not officially confirm that it possesses nuclear weapons (SIPRI, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)).
In parallel, additional regional security arrangements are emerging. Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan signed a defence agreement on 7 August 2026. According to the official announcement, an armed attack on any of the three states is to be regarded as an attack on all (Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). Pakistan’s participation is significant for security policy because of its nuclear arsenal. However, this does not give rise to any publicly documented automatic obligation to use nuclear weapons. Nor does Turkey’s participation automatically extend NATO’s mutual assistance to the other two states. NATO’s mutual assistance clause is governed by its own treaty, in particular Articles 5 and 6 (North Atlantic Treaty (öffnet in neuem Tab)).
In Lebanon and Iraq, state and non-state power structures are also intertwined: Hezbollah remains an autonomous military factor, and Iran-aligned militias have influence within Iraqi institutions. Tehran’s regional partners thus differ not only geographically, but also in their relationship to the respective state.
Kennedy’s sentence describes the risk of driving a nuclear-armed adversary into further escalation without a way out. Today, this danger meets an order of American security guarantees and military partnerships, regional military powers, additional defence agreements and overlapping relationships with several power centres.
The comparison with a second Cold War therefore refers to a lasting strategic competition that extends beyond individual wars. At the same time, it must explain how global rivalries and autonomous regional conflicts interact. Military power, trade, energy, technology and economic dependencies together influence who has room for manoeuvre.
The Middle East is not just another theatre of international competition. It is currently one of the places where it is particularly easy to observe how this new order works.
A Cold War without two clear blocs
In an earlier version, I divided the international order relatively clearly into West, East and a more self-confident Global South. One starting point was G. John Ikenberry’s analysis of these three constellations. He describes them as heterogeneous, changing groupings whose ideas of international order compete with one another (Ikenberry, 2024 (öffnet in neuem Tab)).
Two years later, it is precisely this third part of the argument that seems more important than the supposedly clear juxtaposition of West and East. A new formation of blocs is indeed taking place – but it is neither closed nor clear-cut.
The term “Cold War” must therefore not be derived solely from the fact that states support partners without entering a war directly themselves. That would also be possible in ordinary coalition wars. What matters for the analogy is the existence of a lasting overarching competition for power, influence and international order that outlasts individual conflicts and is fought out on several levels at the same time.
The first Cold War already combined overarching superpower rivalry with autonomous policies within and outside the camps. In the 1956 Suez Crisis, Britain, France and Israel acted against Washington’s position. The Sino-Soviet split likewise shows that the communist camp was not consistently united either (Office of the Historian: Suez Crisis (öffnet in neuem Tab); Office of the Historian: Sino-Soviet split (öffnet in neuem Tab)). Regional autonomy is therefore not an exclusively new phenomenon.
An overarching competition can be observed today between the United States, China and Russia. It encompasses military influence, technology, trade relations, energy, infrastructure and political partnerships. The war in Ukraine, the tensions over Taiwan and the conflicts in the Middle East each have their own causes and actors. They are embedded in this competition, but cannot be fully explained by it.
The levels must be kept apart: direct attacks between Israel and Iran are not a direct war between Washington, Beijing and Moscow. Regional conflicts can touch on global rivalries without all regional decisions originating with the great powers.
Not every single theatre is therefore “cold”. What remains cold is the overarching competition between power centres that have so far not fought out their entire rivalry directly against each other by military means. Such an order of competition persists even when individual wars end or alliances change. It influences which states are armed, which technologies are protected, which trade routes are secured and which political partnerships are built.
In this analysis, the “2.0” denotes an order of overlapping relationships: states can be militarily tied to the USA and cooperate economically with China. Russia and China can support Iran without automatically making its wars their own. The difference from historical bipolarity lies in the interplay of these relationships, not in the claim that all states used to belong unambiguously to a closed camp.
To understand this structure, it is worth taking a closer look at the relationships of individual states.
Bloc formation in the Middle East
China and Russia are particularly relevant to the question of a new formation of blocs, because they are the most likely to act as a joint counterweight to the American-led order. Both states reject an international order dominated by the USA, coordinate more closely diplomatically, are expanding their economic and energy relations and are deepening their military cooperation.
According to Stuart Reid, this rapprochement is deep and lasting; differences between the two states have not so far undone it (Reid, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). At the same time, their interests are not identical. In the 2001 Treaty of Friendship, Article 9 provides for contacts and consultations in the event of security threats. This does not amount to a mutual assistance structure comparable to NATO’s (China–Russia treaty, 2001 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). Military cooperation and political coordination can therefore be substantial without presupposing a fully shared strategy.
China’s relations with Iran also show the limits of a simple East-West logic. Brookings describes an asymmetric partnership: Iran is important to China, but is one of several regional partners. The relationship encompasses economic, diplomatic and security cooperation. However, the statements analysed here do not reveal any unconditional Chinese commitment to defend Iran militarily (Hass & Matthias, January 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab); Chinese Foreign Ministry, June 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)).
The overlapping of different relationships becomes even clearer in the case of Turkey. Ankara has been a member of NATO since 1952 and is therefore institutionally firmly integrated into the Western security architecture. At the same time, Turkey has for years maintained a close and at the same time conflict-ridden relationship with Russia. The two states repeatedly stood on different sides in Syria, compete for influence and do not pursue the same interests in the Black Sea either. Nevertheless, trade, energy relations and political channels of communication have remained in place. Russia continues to be of considerable importance, particularly for Turkey’s energy supply. Cooperation and competition thus exist at the same time (Ülgen et al., 2024 (öffnet in neuem Tab)).
Saudi Arabia remains closely tied to the United States on security and is developing relations with China in parallel. In November 2025, the White House documented a new US-Saudi defence agreement; after talks in June 2026, the Chinese Foreign Ministry described the intended deepening of the strategic partnership (The White House, 2025 (öffnet in neuem Tab); Chinese Foreign Ministry, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). The defence agreement with Turkey and Pakistan in August adds a further relationship (Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). This diversification does not in itself mean abandoning the American partnership.
Egypt also combines different partnerships. The United States and Egypt held the multinational exercise Bright Star 25 from 28 August to 10 September 2025 (CENTCOM, 2025 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). Beijing describes Egypt as a comprehensive strategic partner and in 2026 announced a deepening of cooperation in areas including military matters, AI, trade and industry (Chinese Foreign Ministry, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). Cairo has been a member of BRICS since January 2024 (State Information Service Egypt, 2024 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). In parallel, the EU has developed a comprehensive strategic partnership with Egypt since 2024; the first bilateral security and defence dialogue took place in March 2026 (EEAS, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab); Council of the European Union, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)).
Iraq, too, hardly fits into a simple bloc logic. Baghdad maintains security relations with the United States, while Iran and political and armed groups linked to Tehran have influence within the country (Hamra, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). In addition, there is a strategic partnership with China that also includes economic cooperation (Hamzawy & Selfe, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). These ties overlap within a single state.
At its security core, Israel is particularly closely tied to the United States. Nevertheless, it has economic relations with China. The Congressional Research Service describes China as Israel’s third-largest trading partner after the USA and the EU as a whole; the trade data cited in the report refer to 2021 to 2023. It also documents increased scrutiny of Chinese investment in the light of American security concerns (Sharp, 2025 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). Economic interdependence thus extends beyond the military partnership without overriding this alignment.
In Lebanon, the different ties can hardly be attributed to the state as a whole. Iran supports Hezbollah, while the United States and European states at the same time support the Lebanese Armed Forces and state institutions (CFR, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). On 4 June 2026, the EU decided on a further €100 million for the Lebanese Armed Forces. It cites a strengthened state monopoly on the use of force and the disarmament of non-state armed actors as the objective (Council of the European Union, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). In July, AP reported on US-mediated talks between Lebanon and Israel (Associated Press, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)).
Hamzawy and Selfe continue to describe the USA as the region’s militarily dominant external actor. China combines economic and diplomatic relations with limited security cooperation. At the same time, the paper emphasises overlapping interests between Washington and Beijing: economic relations can follow ordinary business interests and are not automatically an expression of strategic balancing (Hamzawy & Selfe, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)).
Political upheaval can reorder these relationships. Syria shows how the loss of an established partner sets new opportunities and limits for both regional actors and great powers.
Syria: when a proxy order collapses
The fall of Bashar al-Assad on 8 December 2024 changed the regional order within a few days. UN Secretary-General António Guterres described it as a historic opportunity for the Syrian people. He called for an orderly, inclusive political transition and the restoration of Syria’s sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity (UN Secretary-General, 2024 (öffnet in neuem Tab)).
For Iran and Russia, the collapse of the regime meant a considerable strategic loss. Both states had supported Assad militarily and politically for years; Iran also through Hezbollah and other allied militias, Russia in particular since its direct military intervention in 2015. For Tehran, Syria was a central part of the connection to Lebanon and Hezbollah, while Tartus and Hmeimim offered Moscow opportunities for military power projection in the eastern Mediterranean (Blanchard, 2025 (öffnet in neuem Tab); Spicer & Gebeily, 2024 (öffnet in neuem Tab)).
Who toppled Assad – and why at the end of 2024?
The offensive began on 27 November 2024 in north-western Syria. On 3 December, UN Special Envoy Geir Pedersen reported to the Security Council that the al-Fateh al-Mubeen operations room, with HTS and other opposition groups, had crossed the previous de-escalation lines. Large parts of the Aleppo and Idlib governorates came under the control of non-state forces. The UN briefing also named the SNA as a participating opposition actor (United Nations, 3 December 2024 (öffnet in neuem Tab)).
HTS was the strongest force organisationally and Ahmed al-Sharaa one of the central strategic planners of the northern offensive, but the military dynamic rested on several groups of actors, some of which were only loosely coordinated (Spicer & Gebeily, 2024 (öffnet in neuem Tab)).
The distinction between HTS and the SNA is particularly important. The SNA is not a synonym for HTS, but a Turkish-backed umbrella of various Syrian opposition groups. After Assad’s fall, Reuters reconstructed that HTS and the SNA had made arrangements before the offensive began, but that this coordination remained limited. A key aim was to be able to operate in parallel without fighting each other.
While HTS-led forces advanced from Aleppo via Hama and Homs towards Damascus, Turkish-aligned SNA units used the new situation to capture territory in the north from US-backed Kurdish forces, including Tel Rifaat; Manbij also became a theatre of this parallel offensive (Spicer & Gebeily, 2024 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). The various opposition actors shared Assad as their opponent, but not necessarily the same strategic priorities.
Turkey’s role should be neither underestimated nor overstated. Since the beginning of the civil war, Ankara had been one of the most important supporters of the Syrian opposition, maintained its own troops in the north and supported the SNA. According to two sources cited by Reuters, opposition representatives had informed Turkey of their plans months before the attack and interpreted Ankara’s behaviour as tacit approval. Turkish officials, however, contradicted the account that Ankara had ordered or formally approved the offensive; one Turkish official explicitly stated that HTS did not receive operational instructions from Turkey.
What can be said with confidence is therefore mainly this: Turkey knew the opposition milieu very well, had considerable influence over parts of the armed opposition and became one of the strongest external actors after Assad’s fall – but direct Turkish control of the HTS offensive cannot be inferred from this (Spicer & Gebeily, 2024 (öffnet in neuem Tab)).
In the south, groups from Daraa, Suwayda and Quneitra mobilised. Their backgrounds differed. For Daraa in particular, AP describes former rebel units that retained local structures and light weapons after Russian-brokered agreements in 2018. At the end of 2024, southern factions formed a joint operations structure and coordinated with the northern forces. According to AP’s reconstruction, they reached central parts of Damascus before the units coming from the north (Sewell, 2025 (öffnet in neuem Tab)).
The international designation at the time must also be distinguished from organisational affiliation. During the offensive, HTS was still designated by the USA as a Foreign Terrorist Organization; in December 2024, UN News explained its status on the UN terrorist list at the time (UN News, 2024 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). The US revocation only took effect on 8 July 2025 (U.S. Department of State/Federal Register, 2025 (öffnet in neuem Tab)).
The Islamic State (IS/ISIS), for example, was not part of the coalition that toppled Assad. On the contrary: IS remained an independent adversary both of the new forces and of the USA and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). As late as 8 December 2024, U.S. Central Command struck more than 75 known IS targets in central Syria, explicitly to prevent the organisation from using the power vacuum to reorganise (Slayton & Schogol, 2024 (öffnet in neuem Tab)).
Other jihadist networks did not disappear from Syria with the rise of HTS either. The Congressional Research Service refers, for example, to Hurras al-Din, an al-Qaeda-aligned splinter group that emerged from opponents of al-Sharaa’s distancing from al-Qaeda. HTS itself later took action against al-Qaeda-aligned actors. In parallel, nationally oriented opposition groups, Kurdish-led forces, local southern militias and foreign-backed units each pursued their own aims (Blanchard, 2025 (öffnet in neuem Tab)).
The military success of the opposition was also favoured by the fact that the Assad system was hit at an exceptionally unfavourable moment. Reuters described the Syrian armed forces at the end of 2024 as demoralised and organisationally hollowed out. At the same time, Assad’s most important external supporters were considerably less capable of action than in 2015: Russia was tied down by its war against Ukraine; Iran and above all the Lebanese Hezbollah had been weakened by the confrontation with Israel. Hezbollah had already withdrawn elite forces from Syria before the offensive, and Israeli strikes had hit its leadership and military structure hard. The offensive began on 27 November, the same day on which the ceasefire in the Israel-Hezbollah conflict at the time came into force (Spicer & Gebeily, 2024 (öffnet in neuem Tab)).
Israel was therefore not a party to the rebel coalition, but played an indirect role in shaping the strategic starting conditions. The weakening of Hezbollah and Iran-linked structures reduced the external support that had saved Assad from collapse in earlier phases of the civil war. At the same time, Russia was unwilling or unable to repeat the military rescue of 2015.
Assad’s fall was therefore less the product of a single foreign master plan than the convergence of a better-prepared HTS-led offensive, parallel SNA operations, the remobilisation of southern groups, the internal decay of the Syrian armed forces and a regional shift in power that weakened Assad’s most important protectors (Blanchard, 2025 (öffnet in neuem Tab); Sewell, 2025 (öffnet in neuem Tab); Spicer & Gebeily, 2024 (öffnet in neuem Tab)).
From jihadist to president? Ahmed al-Sharaa’s path to Damascus
Hardly any biography makes Syria’s political transformation as visible as that of Ahmed al-Sharaa. At the same time, conceptual precision is particularly important here. Simply calling him a “former IS supporter” would be an oversimplification.
The Congressional Research Service reconstructs al-Sharaa’s early biography partly on the basis of his own statements. According to these, he joined the circle of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in Iraq, was taken into US custody and was released around 2010/2011. He also described contacts with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) when building a jihadist structure in Syria. These details are partly based on his own accounts (Blanchard, 2025 (öffnet in neuem Tab)).
This milieu gave rise to Jabhat al-Nusra, whose leader al-Sharaa – then widely known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Jolani – became. The Nusra Front developed into one of the militarily most significant jihadist groups in the fight against Assad and was for years al-Qaeda’s official Syrian affiliate.
In 2013, al-Baghdadi tried to incorporate Nusra into the newly proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS/ISIL). Al-Sharaa resisted this incorporation and instead pledged allegiance directly to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. In the following years, Nusra and IS forces fought each other. Historically, there is therefore a personal and organisational link to the Iraqi jihadist milieu from which IS also emerged; al-Sharaa, however, was not simply a later Syrian IS commander who subsequently switched sides (Blanchard, 2025 (öffnet in neuem Tab)).
In 2016, al-Sharaa announced the separation from al-Qaeda and continued the Nusra Front as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. At the beginning of 2017, HTS was formed together with other groups. The organisation built an administrative structure in Idlib with the Syrian Salvation Government and took action against al-Qaeda-aligned opponents. This course shows a stronger concentration on territorial and political influence in Syria; in itself, it does not prove a complete ideological transformation (Blanchard, 2025 (öffnet in neuem Tab)).
Since taking power, al-Sharaa has promised national unity and the protection of minorities. At the same time, the position of former HTS cadres and severe sectarian violence raise questions about control over armed forces. For March 2025, Human Rights Watch documented, among other things, killings of Alawite civilians and called for accountability to be investigated at senior levels too (Blanchard, 2025 (öffnet in neuem Tab); Human Rights Watch, 2025 (öffnet in neuem Tab)).
The relevant point is therefore not to reinterpret al-Sharaa retrospectively as the “moderate” opposite of his own past, but to explain the extraordinary political shift: a former AQI actor and al-Qaeda commander became the leader of a territorial de facto government and, after Assad’s fall, the president of Syria’s transitional order.
The international treatment of al-Sharaa also changed. The US revocation of the FTO designation of the al-Nusra Front and HTS took effect with its publication on 8 July 2025 (U.S. Department of State/Federal Register, 2025 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). On 6 November 2025, the UN Security Council decided in Resolution 2799 to remove al-Sharaa personally from the ISIL/Da’esh and al-Qaeda sanctions list (UN Security Council, 2025 (öffnet in neuem Tab)).
Syria is not simply switching camps
After December 2024, the new Syrian leadership developed relations with several power centres at the same time.
At the joint press conference with his Syrian counterpart on 22 December 2025, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan described the cooperation as strategic. He named the integration of the SDF, the fight against IS, and trade, energy, logistics and regional connections as areas of cooperation (Turkish Foreign Ministry, 2025 (öffnet in neuem Tab)).
Western policy also changed. With Executive Order 14312, the United States ended central parts of the Syria sanctions regime with effect from 1 July 2025 (The White House, 2025 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). On 28 May 2025, the EU largely lifted its economic restrictions; security-related measures remained in place (Council of the European Union, 2025 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). On 11 May 2026, the Council restored full application of the EU-Syria Cooperation Agreement (Council of the European Union, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). These steps facilitate relations and economic cooperation, but do not establish membership of a military alliance.
In southern Syria, a different security dynamic emerged at the same time. In 2025, the Congressional Research Service noted that Israel had advanced into previously demilitarised areas and into Syrian territory near the border after Assad’s fall; UN reports documented the continued Israeli presence and the expansion of military activity around the occupied Syrian Golan (Blanchard, 2025 (öffnet in neuem Tab); United Nations Secretary-General, 2025 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). Israel justified parts of its actions with its own security interests and later also with the protection of the Druze minority; Damascus regarded the presence and attacks as a violation of its sovereignty.
Russia did not disappear completely from Syria either. According to the Syrian Foreign Ministry, Damascus and Moscow agreed on 9 August 2026 on a memorandum on the reorganisation of the facilities at Tartus and Hmeimim. Civilian areas are to be transferred to Syrian administration and military facilities converted into joint training centres. The announcement names a transition period of no more than three months (Syrian Foreign Ministry, as reported by SANA, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). If implemented, this would change the special position Russia had under Assad.
Alghannam describes Saudi Arabia’s role as a strategy of its own between stabilising Syria and balancing regional centres of influence. In his analysis, Riyadh cooperates and competes with Ankara, limits Iranian influence and takes a critical view of Israeli moves in the south (Alghannam, 2025 (öffnet in neuem Tab)).
After Assad’s fall, Syria therefore cannot be assigned to a new closed camp. Turkey pursues its own priorities, the USA and the EU are normalising parts of their relations, Israel is exerting military pressure and Saudi Arabia is pursuing its own regional policy. The announced reorganisation of Russian facilities opens up a further avenue of cooperation. Iran, by contrast, has lost a central partner of its Levant strategy with Assad. These different relationships mean neither complete autonomy nor a uniform new dependency.
The consequences of this upheaval, however, extend far beyond Syria. They hit Iran particularly hard, whose regional security strategy for decades rested on a network of allied states and armed groups – and for which Syria was a central logistical and strategic link. Assad’s fall therefore leads directly to the next question: what happens to a proxy strategy when one of its most important hubs breaks away?
Iran: when proxies are no longer enough
For decades, Tehran built relationships with regional partners and armed groups – from Hezbollah in Lebanon and Shiite militias in Iraq to the Houthis in Yemen (Robinson & Merrow, 2024 (öffnet in neuem Tab)).
One term for classifying this policy is “forward defense”: Iran tries to gain strategic depth, influence and options for deterrence through partners outside its own territory. Reisinezhad examines this model and its weakening by regional wars and the collapse of the Assad order (Reisinezhad, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). The strategy thus combines Iranian security interests and power projection; the partners pursue their own aims at the same time.
These partners emerged under different conditions. Hezbollah developed after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and was substantially supported by Iran (CFR, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). Iranian relations with Iraqi armed groups and with the Houthis in Yemen belong to different political and organisational contexts (Robinson & Merrow, 2024 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). The Houthis are an autonomous Yemeni movement and also maintain relations with Iraqi groups (Jalal, 2025 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). A network of Iranian partners is therefore not a uniform organisation under a chain of command that is identical everywhere.
Within this network, Syria played an important logistical role. Under Assad, land connections ran via Iraq and eastern Syria into Lebanon. In 2020, Hasan and Khaddour examined the al-Qa’im/al-Bukamal area as a hub in which Iran-aligned militias exercised influence alongside state actors (Hasan & Khaddour, 2020 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). Such connections complemented other supply routes. The schematic map shows historical connections; it depicts neither a verified current transport route nor continuous Iranian territorial control.
Hezbollah was not only a recipient of Iranian support, but itself a military actor in Syria and an important part of this cross-border security network. In Yemen and Iraq, Ansar Allah and Iran-aligned factions within the Popular Mobilization Forces respectively complemented this structure and enabled Tehran to put pressure on opponents on several geographically distant fronts (Jalal, 2025 (öffnet in neuem Tab); Khaddour & Tokmajyan, 2025 (öffnet in neuem Tab)).
The loss of Syria therefore does not just hit a single ally, but the connective architecture of this system. With Assad’s fall, Iran lost a state that for decades had ensured political access to the Levant and acted as a logistical link to Hezbollah. Accordingly, after the change of regime the Council on Foreign Relations described Syria as one of the most critical hubs of Iran’s proxy network: the new order makes it more difficult to transport weapons and other materiel into Lebanon and limits the Revolutionary Guards’ ability to support Hezbollah via Syrian territory (Hoffman, 2024 (öffnet in neuem Tab)).
Assad’s fall does not mean the complete end of Iranian partner networks. Iran-aligned groups remain relevant in Iraq, while the Houthis have their own military and maritime options (Jalal, 2025 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). However, the loss of the Syrian link changes the geographical options for support (Hoffman, 2024 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). In my view, this increases the pressure on Tehran to reweight its regional relationships; no uniform adjustment strategy that has already been implemented can yet be derived from this.
The weakening of Hezbollah and Assad’s fall coincide with a phase of direct escalation. Israel and Iran attacked each other directly in 2024. In 2025 and 2026, US forces also took part directly in attacks on Iran. Conflicts fought through armed partners and inter-state attacks exist side by side.
At first glance, this direct violence seems to argue against the Cold War analogy. In fact, it mainly shows its limits.
Proxy policy does not guarantee that a conflict will remain permanently contained. As an analytical possibility, indirect support and direct intervention can exist side by side or merge into each other. The escalation described here is an example of this.
For the analogy, what matters is therefore the relationship between global competition and regional wars. The interests of armed groups, regional states and their external partners partly overlap, but are not identical.
China is not becoming Iran’s new patron
A further temptation is to interpret Russia’s loss of importance in the Middle East automatically as China’s rise to become the new Eastern patron.
That, too, falls short.
China’s relations with Iran do not mean that it automatically assumes the role of a military patron. Economic support, diplomatic cooperation and security cooperation are different forms of influence.
From the Chinese perspective, Brookings describes Iran as an important partner, but one that is limited compared with other regional partnerships. Chinese policy combines economic interests with the desire for regional stability. The Foreign Ministry’s statement of June 2026 documents continued political relations and diplomatic support, but no unconditional promise of military protection (Hass & Matthias, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab); Chinese Foreign Ministry, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)).
Likewise, Gulf states can maintain security relations with the USA and economic relations with China at the same time. The scope of such relationships is determined in each case by specific agreements and interests.
This shows an important dimension of international power: economic interdependence opens up opportunities for influence, but at the same time creates dependencies of its own. It can combine cooperation and competition without making a partner fully controllable.
The new front line also runs through supply chains
This is where geoeconomics comes into play.
Edward Luttwak was already writing about geoeconomics in 1990 (Luttwak, 1990 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). In this analysis, I understand it as the use of economic instruments to pursue national interests and geopolitical goals. This working definition makes visible how market decisions, state policy and security issues can overlap.
Economic interdependence can limit rivalries, but also offers states instruments of influence. Whether a specific trade or investment relationship is used strategically must be assessed in each case on the basis of the policy and behaviour of the actors involved.
According to the WTO contribution, US imports from China fell by 29 per cent in 2025. At the same time, at the beginning of 2026 around 72 per cent of global trade in goods was still conducted on most-favoured-nation terms (Staiger/WTO, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)).
The figures show changing trade flows amid continuing interdependence. They do not justify a blanket statement that the world economy as a whole has decoupled into closed camps.
UNCTAD puts global foreign direct investment in 2025 at around US$1.6 trillion (UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). Strategic sectors such as AI infrastructure, semiconductors, critical raw materials and energy transition technologies accounted for 44 per cent of the announced value of new greenfield projects, compared with 16 per cent in 2020 (UNCTAD, July 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). Greenfield projects are projects for new company facilities or sites.
In these sectors, economic interests, industrial policy and security issues overlap.
In 2026, the IEA describes a high concentration in the processing of important minerals and increasing export controls. China holds a dominant position for many raw materials; for nickel, Indonesia is the leading refining location. Such dependencies differ by material and processing stage (IEA, Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)).
Trade, ports, energy, semiconductors, raw materials, data infrastructure and supply chains can thus become instruments of strategic competition. Economic and technological rivalry was already part of the first Cold War. Today, these questions arise within different production networks and mutual dependencies.
And the Middle East connects both worlds
Hardly anywhere do military and geoeconomic power meet as directly as in the Middle East.
According to the IEA’s Oil Market Report of 12 August 2026, the Strait of Hormuz has again been effectively closed since early July; oil facilities and tankers have been attacked. The region’s oil exports fell by 2.1 million barrels per day in July. This is putting pressure on international supply and prices (IEA, August 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)). The conflict shows how military escalation and economic dependencies are intertwined.
A regional war thus has a global economic impact – and economic dependency in turn influences military behaviour.
Energy supply, trade routes and security relations link the interests of external powers with those of the regional states. This opens up opportunities for cooperation, but also for competition. Multiple partner relationships alone do not prove any particular intention to play great powers off against each other (Hamzawy & Selfe, 2026 (öffnet in neuem Tab)).
The Middle East thus connects the military and geoeconomic dimensions of the new competition particularly clearly.
Cold War 2.0 – perhaps only in hindsight
Whether historians will one day actually call the present era a second Cold War cannot be answered today. What matters is less the label than whether a strategic logic can be identified that supports the comparison.
What speaks for the comparison is a long-term competition for influence, security and international order that extends beyond individual wars. Its limits lie where regional causes and decisions are treated merely as an expression of global rivalry. Direct violence in one theatre therefore does not on its own decide whether the analogy holds for the overarching order.
The comparison must also take historical continuities into account: in the first Cold War, too, there were breaks within blocs and regional autonomy. Today, military, economic and diplomatic relationships overlap in different ways. This creates opportunities for action, but also new dependencies.
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran and the new Syrian leadership pursue their own interests. Their room for manoeuvre varies and can change in different directions: new relationships open up opportunities, while military losses, economic dependencies and political upheaval restrict them. Actor-specific comparisons over time would therefore be needed to establish a general increase in regional autonomy.
The Middle East shows these differences particularly clearly. Assad’s fall weakened Iranian and Russian influence without clearly assigning Syria to a new camp. American, Chinese, European and regional relationships overlap. Direct attacks and conflicts fought through armed partners exist at the same time. This order is shaped both by global rivalries and by regional decisions.
Perhaps this era will be described in retrospect as a multipolar reordering or as a phase of regional power struggles within a global competition. The analytical value of “Cold War II” therefore depends on naming differences and similarities precisely: long-term rivalry, overlapping networks and autonomous regional interests.
Global competition meets regional interests. States and armed groups pursue their own goals; their room for manoeuvre remains unevenly distributed. Military partnerships, economic interdependence and diplomatic relations together shape the options open to them.


